

POLYBIUS' OTHER VIEW OF AETOLIA

THE discovery and publication two decades ago of the Roman-Aetolian treaty of 212/11 has helped to place Polybius' reliability as a source under close scrutiny. As a result, his account of the confrontation between the Aetolians and Flamininus at Tempe, in 197, may not stand the test of a comparison. Yet in order to use the preserved inscription as a control for this specific event, Polybius' general feelings concerning Aetolian responsibility for the consequent Syrian War must also be considered. Historians¹ have hitherto assumed that if Polybius is demonstrably antagonistic towards his northern neighbours when recording affairs of the third century, he must be equally so for those of the second century. A close examination of Polybius, however, will reveal substantial reasons for doubting such an assumption.

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For events of the third century, where he is most completely preserved, Polybius is indeed prejudiced against the Aetolians. He unleashes his venom both when following Aratus' *Ῥπομνήματα* to 220 and afterwards when employing various sources.² To Polybius, the Aetolians are violent and aggressive in spirit (iv 3.5), cruel (iv 18.7-9), impious (iv 62.2), haughty (iv 64.8), inhuman (iv 67.3-4), and cowardly (iv 79.1). They are also natural revolutionaries (xiii 1.2), spendthrifts (xiii 1.1), and liars (iv 29.4-5). Though at times Polybius considers their behaviour scandalous (iv 27.1-8), he admits that the Greeks have become quite inured to it (iv 16.1-2). The most grievous faults of the Aetolians, however, are their desire for aggrandizement and lust for booty. Plundering and raiding are habitual for them (iv 3.1, 16.2). Their obsession with booty costs them battles (iv 57-8) and friends (iv 29.4-7), and they think nothing of plundering sacred objects (iv 19.4, 62.2) and even allies (iv 79.2-3).

It is in terms of such innate anti-social characteristics, rather than of any defined policies of state, that Polybius explains their aggressions. The ultimate goal of the Aetolians is the conquest of Greece (ii 49.3). In their actions before 239, they are motivated by *πλεονεξία* (ii 43.9). Later, during Aratus' struggles with Cleomenes, they again yield to their hunger for booty and territorial gain by engaging in a cold war with Achaea (ii 45.1-2, 49.3). Subsequently, they instigate the Social War out of a desire for plunder (iv 2.11-3.5). And when that war is over, they are so angry at having lost every opportunity to amass more spoils that despite being severely defeated, they are ready to fight again (v 107.5-7). In the First Macedonian War, the Aetolians once more, of course, decide to fight for the benefits of immediate gain (e.g. L.[ivy] xxvi 24—from Polybius³—and P.[olybius] ix 39.1-2), despite the long term risk of Roman encroachment (ix 37.8). In every instance, then, Polybius portrays them as driven on by these simplistic and wanton aspirations.

¹ E.g., Günther Klaffenbach, *Der Römisch-Ätolische Bündnisvertrag vom Jahre 212 v. Chr. in Sitzungsberichte der deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin* (1954) 19; E. Badian, Review of G. A. Lehmann's *Untersuchungen zur historischen Glaubwürdigkeit des Polybios* (Münster, 1967) (hereafter, Lehmann), in *Historische Zeitschrift*, ccviii (1969) 642; J. Muylle, 'Le Traité d'amitié entre Rome et la ligue étolienne', in *L'Antiquité Classique*, xxxviii (1969) 428; and Jürgen Deininger, Review of Lehmann, *Gnomon* xlii (1970) 67.

² Polybius discusses his sources: iv 2.1-2. Where he uses Aratus he may still be supplying his own invective against the Aetolians: J. A. O. Larsen,

'The Aetolians and the Cleomenic War', in *The Classical Tradition: Literary and Historical Studies in Honor of Harry Caplan* (1966) 43-57. Moreover, for some Greek affairs prior to 220, Polybius may not be following Aratus; his criticisms of the Aetolians in these sections would certainly then be his own: Erich S. Gruen, 'Aratus and the Achaean Alliance with Macedon', in *Historia* xxi (1972) 609-625, especially 617-20. For a more complete discussion of Polybius' sources, cf. F. W. Walbank, *Commentary on Polybius* I 26-34 (hereafter, Walbank I or II), and *Polybius* (Berkeley, 1972) 74-84.

³ Alfred Klotz, *Livius und seine Vorgänger* II 115.

This *topos* for the third century, however, differs markedly from Polybius' explanation for what provoked the Aetolians into inviting Antiochus to Greece. In his famous statement on causes, pretexts, and first acts, Polybius uses as an example the Syrian War (iii 7.1-3):

So too the war of Antiochus with Rome. The *cause* (*αἰτία*) was evidently the exasperation (or, 'anger'—*ὀργή*) of the Aetolians, who, thinking that they had been slighted in a number of instances at the end of the war with Philip, not only called in the aid of Antiochus, but resolved to go to every extremity in satisfying the anger which the events of that time had aroused in them. This was the *cause*. As for the *pretext* (*πρόφασις*), it was the liberation of Greece, which they went from city to city with Antiochus proclaiming, without regard to reason or truth; while the *first act* (*ἀρχή*) in the war was the descent of Antiochus upon Demetrias.⁴

Instead of the expected unequivocal condemnation of Aetolian actions, the passage contains a contrast between the *πρόφασις*, proclaimed *ἀλόγως καὶ ψευδῶς*, and the *αἰτία*, arising out of a feeling of being slighted. While Polybius unquestionably condemns the pretext, his judgment of the cause is withheld.⁵ Moreover, this *αἰτία* is distinguished from the *αἰτίαι* propounded to explain the beginnings of previous Aetolian wars, for *ὀργή*, and not the love of plunder or territorial gain, has become Aetolia's chief motivation.⁶ The love of plunder or aggression is self-induced, arising from within the Aetolians; thus they are considered unilaterally responsible for their participation in previous wars. But the *ὀργή* is not internally generated: it is a response to what the Aetolians felt was inequitable treatment by the Romans. Without the interaction of the Aetolians and the Romans, there would not have been an *ὀργή*, nor a Syrian War.

This interaction is evidenced further in the underlying theme of Polybius' *Histories*: the accounting for the growth of the Roman empire.⁷ And it was an inevitable and determined development which Polybius recorded⁸: '... we see that the war with Antiochus took its rise from that with Philip; that with Philip from the Hannibalian; and the Hannibalian from the Sicilian War; and though between these wars there were numerous events of various character, they all converged upon the same consummation' (iii 32.7). Such a schema again indicates that Polybius did not attribute to the Aetolians the same *αἰτία* for the Syrian War as for previous ones. For, if Polybius regarded the war with Antiochus as a natural outgrowth of Roman expansion,⁹ the immediate corollary is that the *ὀργή* of the Aetolians is also a natural outgrowth of that expansion.

The remainder of the paper attempts to prove that also in his narrative for the period, 197-189, Polybius does not criticise the Aetolians on account of their *ὀργή*. Instead, he views it as resulting from this inevitable clash between the Aetolians and Romans. Polybius' sentiments concerning the Aetolians will be considered in two separate stages. First, by examining the events from the Isthmian declaration until the conclusion of the Syrian War, there can be revealed Polybius' neutrality—or at times even sympathy—regarding both the Aetolians and the cause of their anger. Second, a return to the conferences at Larisa and

⁴ All translations by Shuckburgh unless otherwise noted; those from Livy are from Sage's Loeb edition. On the Aetolian *ὀργή*, cf. P. iii 3.3.

⁵ The outbreak of the Second Punic War is in some respects similar (iii 15.9-13). Polybius declares Hannibal's *πρόφασις* to be false, and like the Aetolians he acted in extreme anger. But Polybius goes even further here and actually exculpates Hannibal within the context of the *αἰτία ἀληθινή*.

⁶ Though the Aetolians were unquestionably angered by the denial of three towns which they

thought were theirs, the anger encompasses far more than just unsatisfied territorial desires: Polybius specifically says they felt belittled *κατὰ πολλά*. This will be confirmed later.

⁷ E.g., P. i 1.5-6; cf. Walbank, *Polybius* 130, n. 1 for a complete list of passages.

⁸ Cf. F. W. Walbank, 'Polybius and Rome's Eastern Policy', in *JRS* liii (1963) 1-13, and *Polybius* 160-6.

⁹ Cf. Walbank I 361 and *JRS* liii (1963) 6.

Tempe will explain why this is so and may lead to a better understanding of the ostensible differences between the extant treaty inscription and Polybius' narrative.

196–189: THE POLYBIAN FRAGMENTS

This section will be concerned only with whatever of Polybius is extant for these years. Those passages in Livy which transmit certain or probable Polybian sentiments and in which Polybius is no longer extant will be dealt with in the subsequent section.

For this period, admittedly, Polybius begins immediately with an attack on his northern neighbours. In 196, in reaction to the Isthmian declaration, the Aetolians employ outrageous arguments against the Romans for their occupation of the fetters. Polybius is clearly critical of Aetolian behaviour: they repeat such slander (xviii 45.8: *διαβολή*) against the Romans excessively (45.7: *κατακόρωσ*). But Polybius' criticism here is directed at Aetolian propaganda arising out of the already established *ὄργή* and not aimed at the worthiness of the *ὄργή* itself. Polybius considers the *αἰτία* to have culminated at Tempe (xviii 45.1, *infra*, p. 105). Indeed, later, when Flamininus does evacuate the fetters (L. xxxiv 49), this in no way assuages the Aetolian anger, so it does not seem to have been part of it. Whether the Aetolians were right in being angry with the Romans does not here concern Polybius; instead, he is denying the validity of the Aetolian propaganda, just as he also criticises the *πρόφασις* as being false.¹⁰

Polybius' verbatim account for the years 195–191 is lost, but a reasonable portion does survive for 191–189. Amidst these fragments there can be found not a single disparaging remark concerning the Aetolians. On the contrary, on events for which they could conceivably be criticised, as Polybius does for pre-200 affairs, there is silence or even apology. In general, Polybius portrays the Aetolians as being in a hopeless situation—and one from which the Romans refuse to extricate them. There is a hint of this in iii 3.6, where he refers to events of this period as the *ἀτυχία* of the Aetolians and the Cephallenians.

One such instance is the first peace attempt after the fall of Heraclea (P. xx 9–10). Glabrio's harsh response to their surrender *in fidem* succeeded in wrecking effective negotiations, for Polybius writes that the Aetolian *πλήθος* was exasperated (*ἀπεθηριώθη*) by the Roman conduct (xx 10.15). And in explaining why the Aetolians discontinued the talks, he mentions this frustration ahead of Antiochus' promise of additional aid (10.16): thus making it clear that before word from Antiochus arrived Glabrio could have secured a quick peace—had he wanted one.¹¹ Indeed, when the Aetolians finally do get to send an embassy to Rome, the Senate's refusal to define the *deditio in fidem* ends negotiations once again (P. xxi 2 = L. xxxvii 1.1–6).

Later, P. Scipio arrives with his brother in Greece and is anxious to settle the war there and move on to Asia Minor. Polybius says that the Aetolians are certainly ready to talk peace: *ἐτοίμως δὲ κακείνων συννηπακούοντων* (xxi 4.8). And while Africanus too is willing, his brother sticks to the Senate's terms. Polybius' view of these terms may be seen in his description of the Aetolian reaction: to the Aetolians, 'one of the alternatives was impossible owing to the amount of money demanded, and the other was rendered alarming in their eyes by the deception they had experienced before, when, after submitting to the surrender, they had narrowly escaped being thrown into chains' (xxi 5.2–3). This statement, without any of the vitriolics which he bestows upon the Aetolians when describing third-century affairs, reflects the *ἀτυχία* stated by Polybius in Book iii.

¹⁰ Cf. P. iii 15.9–10 on Polybius' criticism of a false *πρόφασις* where there is a true and justified *αἰτία* (*supra*, n. 5).

¹¹ The Glabrio incident is central to understanding

the concept of *deditio in fidem* and hence much discussed; most recently by Wolfgang Flurl, *Deditio in Fidem: Untersuchungen zu Livius und Polybios* (München, 1969) 26–78.

Criticism of the Aetolians might be expected when subsequent negotiations in Rome break down. This failure is again partly a result of the Senate's implacable stand, but also due in part to the invasion launched into the North by Nicander the Aetolian during the truce period (L. xxxvii 49.5, Diod. xxix 9). Yet instead of criticism, Polybius takes pains to justify Nicander's effort. Aetolian aid in liberating Athamania from Philip and restoring Amynder is looked upon as an action against Philip's agents engaged in *superbum atque immodicum imperium* (L. xxxviii 1.2—a Polybian passage¹²). He does not pass judgment on Nicander's other successes in the North, but does remark that the peoples of Amphilochia and Aperantia voluntarily went over to Aetolia and the Dolopians made only token resistance (P. xxi 25.5–7). And Polybius states simply that Nicander's purpose was to secure the northern borders against invasion (P. xxi 25.7), making no mention of wanton aggression, murdering, plundering, nor anything for which the Aetolians had become famous in earlier times and again afterwards. In fact, Polybius distinctly compliments the Aetolians elsewhere. Twice during his description of the siege of Ambracia, he writes that the Aetolians resisted *γενναίως* (xxi 27.1, 28.2).

There are other passages also which may indicate this different Polybian treatment of the Aetolians. As the initial negotiations between Aetolia and Rome break down because of Glabrio, Nicander returns from Asia Minor with encouragement from Antiochus (xx 11). Polybius takes pains to recount Nicander's experience while passing through Greece. Nicander falls into the hands of Philip but receives such kindness that, later during the Third Macedonian War, he feels compelled to honour the benevolence by supporting Perseus. That action will cost him his freedom, as he is eventually transported to Rome. There is more to Nicander's relations with Philip, however, than Polybius is willing to reveal. Though he portrays Nicander's loyalty as being a debt for a gratuitous kindness, Nicander had some sort of standing relationship with Philip—and Polybius knew of it. In 192, the Aetolians had sent him to Macedonia in hopes of persuading Philip to join their cause (L. xxxv 12—from Polybius¹³). Their association therefore predates Philip's actions, and it may go back before 192: it is possible that the Aetolians sent Nicander to Philip at that time precisely because there already existed an established friendship. Polybius' suppression of this fact in his later story may indicate that he wished to portray how Nicander, acting essentially out of an idealistic loyalty, received from his countrymen *ὑποψία καὶ διαβολή* in return. The case bears some resemblance to Polybius' own, and it is interesting that he was willing to use as his subject an Aetolian of the 190s.¹⁴

Another possibly sympathetic expression is the speech made by Leon of Athens on behalf of the Aetolians at the final peace conference in Rome (P. xxi 31.6–16). At the time, Rome was still ill-disposed to settle with Aetolia: Philip, angered by the Aetolian annexation of Athamania and Dolopia which were previously under his control, had influenced the Senate against the Aetolian delegation (31.3–4). Rhodes and Athens, natural enemies of Philip, hoped to bring about a peace quickly in order to thwart Philip's territorial ambitions. Hence the sentiments expressed by Leon may be understood as special pleading. He maintained that the Aetolian people should not be blamed for the war, but rather a few evil men stirred them *παρὰ φύσιν . . . πᾶν καὶ λέγειν καὶ πράττειν*, much as a strong wind does the placid ocean. For in fact, Aetolia was Rome's most loyal Greek ally (31.11–13).

Though the speech is probably a fairly accurate account of what Leon said,¹⁵ Polybius

¹² Heinrich Nissen, *Kritische Untersuchungen über die Quellen der vierten und fünften Dekade des Livius* 202. Hereafter, Nissen.

¹³ Nissen 167.

¹⁴ Polybius' treatment is sufficiently sympathetic to make modern scholars speculate that Nicander was one of Polybius' informants while both were detained in Italy: Walbank I 34 and n. 6. Yet see

the justified criticism of Paul Pédech, *La Méthode historique de Polybe* 361, n. 35.

¹⁵ The sea metaphor is elsewhere recorded by Polybius (xi 29.9–10), but it is probable that neither speech is his own creation: F. W. Walbank, 'Speeches in Greek Historians' *The Third J. L. Myres Memorial Lecture* (Oxford, 1965) 14.

appears to have given his approval: *Καὶ γὰρ ἐδόκει <μετὰ> Δάμων' ὁ Κιχησίου <Λέ>ων ἄλλα τε καλῶς εἰπεῖν καὶ παραδείγματι πρὸς τὸ παρὸν οἰκείῳ χρήσασθαι κατὰ τὸν λόγον (31.6)*. Now surely Polybius himself could not believe that the Aetolians were not naturally reckless in word and deed, even in the second century.¹⁶ Yet he may have genuinely felt that the Aetolian masses were reasonably blameless for initiating hostilities, for it was Thoas in particular—one of the 'evil winds' named in the speech—who first suggested the possibility of war and riled the masses with great promises (L. xxxv 12.4–5, 32.2–4—from Polybius¹⁷). Polybius, in fact, is quite certain that on the whole the Aetolians were then and often in their history led into something by one or two individuals. Dorimachus and Scopas involved them in the Social War without their knowledge (iv 5). Agelaus, who earnestly worked for a united Greece (v 104), kept them at peace in 217 against their will (v 107.5–7). And finally, on the death of Lyciscus, 'the Aetolians from that hour lived harmoniously and at peace with each other, simply from the removal of one man' (P. xxxii 4.1 = xxxii 19 in Shuckburgh). It is possible, then, that Polybius emphasised Leon's appeal because he believed at least part of it.¹⁸

It would seem from an examination of the period, 196–189, that Polybius has withheld criticism of the Aetolians and at times even appears sympathetic. Rather than on the Aetolian people, he places the blame on a few violent individuals. This is consistent. Polybius, for good reason, is a firm believer that the innocent should not be punished along with the guilty (v 11.5).

196–189: THE POLYBIAN PASSAGES PRESERVED IN LIVY

For this period, Livy is completely preserved, and when writing about affairs in the East, he is nearly always following Polybius closely. By comparing the corresponding passages of the two historians, however, it can be shown that Livy at times alters by addition or deletion the account of his source. The additions are usually in the form of criticism of the enemy—in this case Aetolia—and the deletions are normally of those sentiments portraying Rome or a Roman commander in an unfavourable light.¹⁹ But it would be hazardous to ascribe to Livy any *Tendenz* here; for though he occasionally adds his own criticisms to Polybius' neutral or sympathetic account of Aetolian affairs,²⁰ so too at times he preserves sentiments favourable to them.²¹

Nor does it seem possible to isolate an anti-Aetolian *Tendenz* which Livy may have transmitted from the annalists.²² Only one annalistic judgment of the Aetolians is to be found: *cum ingenio inquietam tum iratam Romanis* (L. xxxiii 44.7).²³ While angry the Aetolians surely were, *ingenio inquietam* alone is insufficient evidence to establish a *Tendenz*; and the possibility cannot be excluded that Livy interpolated his own thoughts here too. It can only be said,

¹⁶ Cf. p. iii 7.2 on the origins of the Syrian War: (*οἱ Αἰτωλοὶ*) *πάν δὲ καὶ πράξαι καὶ παθεῖν ὑπέστησαν* . . . But Polybius does not qualify it with *παρὰ φύσιν*. And cf. P. xxx 11 on second-century vitriolics.

¹⁷ Nissen 167 and 172–3.

¹⁸ Lehmann, 86, points to the speech as indicating that Polybius is not one-sidedly malicious towards the Aetolians.

¹⁹ Nissen, chapter 4, and John Briscoe, *A Commentary on Livy, Books XXXI–XXXIII*, 1–12 and 22, n. 4 (hereafter, Briscoe).

²⁰ Cf. especially P. xx 9–10=L. xxxvi 27–8; see p. 97 of this paper. Nissen himself used this case, p. 30. Also P. xviii 3.1=L. xxxii 33.9–11: the

addition of *vir ut inter Aetolos facundus* (cf. Briscoe 233) and Alexander's negative attitude concerning the conference; and P. xxi 5.7=L. xxxvii 7.4: Livy adds the self-pity.

²¹ E.g., L. xxxvi 29.1–2=P. xx 10.15–6 (with insignificant differences); L. xxxvii 7.1–2=P. xxi 5.2–4; L. xxxviii 3.3–8 (but not .9)=P. xxi 25.3–11; and L. xxxviii 5.8–9=P. xxi 27.7–9 (with lacuna).

²² Livy occasionally consulted the annalists for Eastern policy: he cites them at xxxii 6.5–8; xxxiii 10.8–10, and 30.8–11; cf. Nissen 34–5 and Briscoe 11.

²³ Nissen 150–1. Briscoe, 11, points out that the adjoining passage, 44.8, though annalistic may contain Polybian language.

then, that at particular times Livy embarks upon his own vilification of the Aetolians. Such knowledge is still valuable: for this period, Polybius has failed to criticise the Aetolians, so vitriolics found in Livy where Polybius is no longer extant can at least be suspected of being Livian interpolations.

Several statements in Livy accuse the Aetolians of being haughty, impudent, or insincere.²⁴ While usually surrounded by probable Polybian material, there is no way to determine if the criticisms themselves are also Polybian. But Livy can be shown to have included the same such charges in a passage where Polybius clearly does not. In the initial peace attempt of 191, the Aetolians failed to realise the implications of a *deditio in fidem*, so Glabrio threatened to incarcerate the envoys to show them what the surrender meant. That much from Polybius (xx 9–10). When Livy recounts the episode, he adds, among other things, that the Aetolians were insincere in their surrender (xxxvi 27.8: *ita enim et illis violandi supplices verecundiam se imposituros, et ipsos nihilo minus suae potestatis fore, si quid melius fortuna ostendisset*) and that, by threatening them, Glabrio had broken the spirit of the haughty Aetolians (28.6: *fracta Phaeneae ferocia Aetolisque aliis est*). As there is not even a hint of Aetolian duplicity or arrogance in the original Polybian version, it is certain that Livy freely supplied his own *sententiae* here. He may well have done the same in the other instances as well.

Two important episodes preserved by Livy merit further examination. In 195, Flamininus holds a conference of Greek states to decide on a united policy against the Spartan tyrant, Nabis. The speeches of most of the principals are preserved in Livy's account, and there can be little doubt that they are on the whole directly from Polybius. Alexander the Aetolian complains that his country was robbed of its just rewards after the last war; he accuses Flamininus of deceit in holding on to the fetters; and finally, he requests that the Romans leave Greece, for the Aetolians can supervise the conquest of Argos (xxxiv 23.5–11). Aristaenus of Achaëa makes the rebuttal; it is reminiscent of Polybius' harangues against the Aetolians for third-century affairs. The Aetolians are repeatedly called brigands and robbers. Aristaenus appeals to Titus, begging him not to allow Aetolia a free hand in the situation (24.1–5).

Though these sentiments, hostile to the Aetolians, are probably Polybius' own, they in no way contradict the present thesis. The origin of the Syrian War is not at issue here; rather, Aristaenus (Polybius) is reacting to Aetolian attempts to gain a foothold in the Peloponnesus. As this is nothing more than a return to Social War politics, Aetolian aggression is answered in the very same terms that it was decades earlier. The point is proven by the fact that though Alexander has made other arguments—that Aetolia has been cheated and that Rome is really enslaving Greece—Polybius ignores those in Aristaenus' rebuke, concentrating only on the question of Argos. Thus to Polybius, Alexander's hostility towards Flamininus was a side issue, and it was the more important question of Peloponnesian hegemony to which Aristaenus was to address himself. The allied censure of the Aetolians subsequent to Aristaenus' speech (24.5–6), most likely from Polybius, also concerns this one question.²⁵

²⁴ L. xxxiv 24.1, 49.7; xxxv 34.4; xxxvi 17.8 (though it is probably not even Polybian: Ragnar Ullmann, *La Technique des discours dans Salluste, Tite Live et Tacite* [Oslo, 1927] 147–8); and xxxv 33.9–11. The last concerns Damocritus and his famous insult to Flamininus that the former would personally hand the declaration of war to the Roman commander when the Aetolians and Syrians camped along the Tiber. Damocritus' subsequent captivity was avidly recorded by the annalists (xxxvii 3.8, 46.5—Nissen 189 and 197). Polybius also appears to have mentioned him further, as reflected in L. xxxvi

24.12 and Appian *Syr.* 21 (*cf.* Nissen 184). But note what Livy has, which Appian does not: *Ob eam ferociam maius victoribus gaudium traditus fuit*. A Livian addition?

²⁵ The Aetolian assassination of Nabis and the momentary seizure of Sparta (L. xxxv 35 f.) closely parallel the episode. There is direct criticism of Aetolia here also, but again Polybius' anger is directed at Aetolian intervention within the Peloponnesus, rather than at a possible cause for the Syrian War. Relevant here is Polybius' criticism of the supposed *πρόφασις* of that war, Aetolia's desire

Another passage to be considered is the second Aetolian embassy to the Roman Senate. The original Polybian account is again lost. Diodorus (xxix 9) gives the gist of the story in following Polybius (*cf.* as a control, Diod. xxix 4 = P. xxi 2). Livy renders a full account; in fact, it is clearly too full (xxxvii 48–9). Livy, *c.* 48, is a recounting of Antias' story of the rumoured defeat of Scipio in Asia Minor; Antias gives it as the reason why the Aetolians refuse to cooperate with the Senate. Chapter 49 is for the most part from Polybius, as Diodorus confirms key portions. However, sections 7–8 are, as Nissen points out, annalistic.²⁶ The Terentius in these sections is the same man as in *c.* 48; and the decree which supposedly bars all Aetolian embassies from Italy without prior permission is a fabrication, for it contradicts the action taken by the Aetolians in Livy xxxviii 3.7 (a Polybian passage).

Naturally, when Livy cites (though does not follow) an annalistic tradition in *c.* 48 and follows it at the end of *c.* 49, possible annalistic influence may be suspected in the remainder of his account. Moreover, while Diodorus merely states that the Aetolians recounted to the Romans their past services instead of their mistakes, Livy uses the fact as a vehicle for disparaging the Aetolian audacity (49.1–5). As Diodorus' account is probably abbreviated, it cannot be *proven* that the vitriolics in Livy were not in Polybius. But the *feroces animos* is most reminiscent of other *sententiae* expressed by Livy.²⁷

In summary, it is impossible to determine with certainty whether the disparaging remarks in Livy are his own inventions. But in what of Polybius is still extant, there can be found nothing similar. With the exception then of when Aetolia involved herself in Peloponnesian affairs, Polybius may well have refrained from criticising her actions in the manner he did for third-century events.

197: THE CONFERENCES AT LARISA AND TEMPE

The first definite sign of Roman hostility towards the Aetolians occurs after the battle of Cynoscephalae. The Aetolians anticipated the Roman soldiers to the war booty; the Romans believed themselves robbed of what was rightfully theirs and complained to Flaminius. So they began to find fault with the Aetolians: ἤρξαντο καταμέμφεσθαι (P. xviii 27.3–4). From the verbal construction, it appears that the army's dissatisfaction with the Aetolians becomes long-standing; indeed, it was to become an important factor in determining Titus' later behaviour (xviii 34.1). But there is not a word of Polybian criticism here. In fact, Polybius recounts the Aetolian valour during the battle (xviii 19.9–11, 21.5–8, 22.3–7), possibly implying that the Aetolians were entitled to at least part of that booty.²⁸

By the time the army arrives at Larisa, Titus is angry with the Aetolians. They have taken the booty, are bragging that they are responsible for the victory, and will undoubtedly fill the power vacuum left by Philip. So he is abrupt whenever he encounters them and

to 'liberate' Greece (p. 93). It too reflects third-century politics, as the Aetolians appear to have offered the same false *πρόφασις* for the First Macedonian War (xi 5.1).

²⁶ Nissen 197–8.

²⁷ And here, as in the previous events regarding Sparta, there is a parallel episode in the first Aetolian embassy to Rome: L. xxxvii 1 = P. xxi 2. Nissen (188) has shown that Livy draws on Polybius here, despite the fact that the episode in Livy is surrounded by annalistic material. But as in the embassy discussed above, Livy may have added his own opinion, or consulted, and thus have been influenced

by, annalists. The description of the Aetolian people as being *indomita et insociabilis gens* (1.4) is similar to a proven Livian *sententia* and also to a possible annalistic statement (xxxiii 44.7): *cum ingenio inquietam*.

²⁸ For a discussion and current bibliography of the problem of Aetolian participation in the battle, *cf.* Briscoe 251 and 253–4: most modern scholars believe it to have been substantial. Compare this description of Aetolian behaviour with that in an earlier action of the same war: L. xxxi 41–2—from Polybius, Nissen 129.

ignores their advice, seeking counsel among his personal friends. His congeniality towards Philip's envoys is such a volte-face that the Aetolians believe he is bribed. But they are judging by Greek standards, especially their own (xviii 34). Subsequently at Tempe, the Aetolians are extensively rebuked by Flaminius for suggesting that Philip be deposed. When they insist on rights granted in the treaty of 212/11, Titus declares their claims and the treaty invalid. The rest of the Greeks are happy, the Aetolians sullen; this is the beginning of great evils for the Greeks (xviii 36-9). Though Polybius does not use the word here, clearly he has the *ὄργη* in mind. At closer examination, these events will reveal that, just as before (iii 7.1-3), Polybius does not specifically blame the Aetolians for their anger.

Chapter 34 begins with two lacunae.²⁹ The initial and more important one veils the narrative from the time Titus arrives at Larisa to the beginning of his thoughts on the Aetolians. The second, coming between Flaminius' dislike of Aetolian *πλεονεξία* and his resolution not to make the Aetolians masters of Greece is easily emended and need not be of any concern.³⁰ Calculated restorations within the first lacuna can be made with the help of the parallel passages in Livy.

At first glance, Livy xxxiii 11 appears hopelessly confused. Livy tells of Philip's herald asking for a truce: he wishes to bury the dead and wants permission to send an embassy (11.3). Flaminius grants both requests, but his encouragement of the Macedonian arouses the anger of the Aetolians. (Such an Aetolian reaction is not found in Polybius until Flaminius' encouragement to an embassy late in the chapter, and there it is an embassy which only concerns itself with bringing Flaminius and Philip together, not with burying the dead.) There follows in Livy several complaints of the Aetolians, some of which appear to be similar to what is still extant in Polybius xviii 34. The chapter concludes with Titus' reasons for his anger (corresponding to those at the beginning of Polybius' episode), and a statement of his strategy (not found in Polybius): to reduce the stature of the Aetolians in the eyes of all men. Chapter 12 begins with a continuation of the (apparent) confusion of embassies, for a fifteen day truce has already been granted and a meeting arranged with Philip.

Holleaux has addressed himself to the problem, with characteristic success.³¹ There can be little doubt that there were in fact two missions, the first of a herald to bury the dead and ask permission to send an embassy and the second of that embassy, under a flag of truce, to gain an armistice and lay the groundwork for a meeting between Flaminius and Philip. Holleaux rightly places the herald in the first lacuna in Polybius, considering the embassy recorded in the extant Polybius (34.4-5) as the second mission reflected in Livy 12.1.

There was, however, more than just the reception of Philip's herald discussed in what has become the first lacuna. Allusions within the extant portion of Polybius supply the framework. After giving Flaminius' reasons for his anger at the Aetolians, Polybius states, *τοιούτης δ' ούσης δυσχρηστίας ἐν ἀμφοτέροις* (34.4), thus indicating that he has already listed grievances against Flaminius. And the content of these complaints is hinted at in the Aetolian reaction to Titus' favourable reception of the Macedonian embassy: *διπλασίως ἐξεκάετο τὰ τῆς ὑποψίας κατὰ τοῦ Τίτου* (34.6). This 'doubling' of the suspicion suggests that the Aetolians had earlier become apprehensive of Titus and his handling of the herald's requests.³² Polybius' account, along with its Livian counterpart, can be presented thus:

²⁹ As printed in the Büttner-Wobst text and followed by the Loeb edition.

³⁰ The corresponding passages in Livy appear to contain little more (though rearranged) than is still extant in Polybius. Holleaux (98), following Reiske, suggested in completing the sentence, *δυσηρεστείτο*, inspired by *et suscensebat. . . Aetolis ob insatiabilem aviditatem praedae* (L. xxxiii 11.8): Maurice Holleaux,

'*Le caduceator* envoyé par Philippe V à T. Quintius Flaminius en 197 (Tite Live, 33,11,3-4)', in *Études d'épigraphie et d'histoire grecques* V 86-103. All subsequent references to Holleaux concern his various works collected in this volume.

³¹ Holleaux, '*Le caduceator . . .*' *supra*, n. 30.

³² Holleaux 95.

<i>P.xviii</i>	<i>EVENTS IN POLYBIUS' ACCOUNT</i>	<i>L.xxxiii</i>
33.1	Philip moves back to Macedonia through Tempe	11.1
33.2-3	Philip orders destruction of archives	11.1
33.4-7	Editorial approving this act	omitted
33.8	Flaminius moves to Larisa	11.2
lacuna	Herald from Philip to Flaminius	11.3
lacuna: from 34.6	Favourable reception of herald inflames Aetolians or increases their anger ³³	11.4
lacuna: from 34.4	Aetolian complaints	probably in 11.4-7
34.1	Titus complains Aetolians are: (1) greedy	11.8
34.1	(2) not to win Greece	11.9
34.2	(3) braggarts	11.8
34.3	Hence Titus curt with Aetolians and confides in Roman advisors	are these summarized in 11.10?
34.4	Thus state of <i>δυσχρηστία</i> on both sides/	
34.4-5	Romans negotiate alone with ambassadors	omitted
34.5	Conference with Philip arranged	12.1
34.6-8	Consequent doubling of Aetolian suspicions that Flaminius was bribed	omitted
35	Excursus on bribery among Romans	omitted
36.1	Flaminius summons allies to conference	12.1

To sketch in the lacuna any further, it is necessary to consult Livy. The important question here, of course, is: how faithfully did he follow Polybius? Livy obviously omits much after Flaminius' grievances. He does not mention the actual embassy or the question of an excursus on bribery, but just alludes to the arrangements for the conference at Tempe (12.1) when resuming the narrative at that point. The omission of the embassy may be due in part to Livy's occasional practice of abbreviating Polybius' account; that would be especially apropos here, as the herald and the embassy are similar events.³⁴ And it is likely that he was uncomfortable both with an extended discussion of bribery and with Flaminius' tactics of ignoring the Greeks in his decision-making.³⁵ But up to the point of these omissions, at least, Livy appears to have followed his source closely, the accounts concurring at almost every point when they coincide. Thus with some confidence Livy may be used in restoring what was in the lacuna.

In addition to the reception of the herald, there are two other passages in Livy which do not have their obvious counterparts in the extant Polybius. The first is the series of Aetolian complaints in reaction to Flaminius' encouragement of the Macedonian herald. The Aetolians worry that Flaminius is manipulating events on his own for the sake of personal gain. Prior to this, he consulted with the Aetolians and other allies, but now, because he wants rewards from Philip, he acts unilaterally (L. 11.4-7). These grievances fit the skeletal picture provided by Polybius' statements at 34.4 and .6, and could neatly fill the lacuna. They therefore should be given credence: though whether they reflect Polybius' version of those complaints precisely is questionable, but that need not be considered here.³⁶

³³ The question of whether the mission of the herald initiated or increased Aetolian anger arises out of Livy's lack of clarity; but whatever the answer, Livy's obfuscation appears unintentional: Briscoe 267.

³⁴ Holleaux 98-100.

³⁵ On the latter point, Holleaux 100-3. Yet L. 11.5, even if Livy rearranged its position within the text (Holleaux 97, n. 2), indicates that Livy did not omit all such sentiments.

³⁶ Holleaux has questioned parts of this section, seeing references to sentiments expressed elsewhere in Polybius. He argues that Livy has conflated in this section the Aetolian ill-feelings for the entire chapter. Livy 11.5, *ante pugnam omnia magna parvaque communicare cum sociis solitum; nunc omnium expertes consiliorum esse, suo ipsum arbitrio cuncta agere*, is equated with P.34.3, *διὸ καὶ κατὰ τε τὰς ἐντεύξεις ἀγερωχότερον αὐτοῖς ἀπήντα* (a phrase not in Livy) *καὶ περὶ τῶν κοινῶν ἀπεισιόπλα, τὰ δὲ προκειμένα*

The origin of the second passage is not so easily solved: *Ob eas causas multa sedulo, ut viliores levioresque apud omnes essent et viderentur, faciebat* (L. 11.10). It is the single Livian remark between Flamininus' complaints and the allusion in 12.1 to a Macedonian embassy. Within Polybius' extant account the only statements which could have inspired it are those immediately subsequent to the complaints: Flamininus' avoidance of the Aetolians (*διὸ καὶ κατὰ τε τὰς ἐντεύξεις ἀγερωχότερον αὐτοῖς ἀπήντα καὶ περὶ τῶν κοινῶν ἀπεσιώπα, τὰ δὲ προκείμενα συνετέλει καὶ δι' αὐτοῦ καὶ διὰ τῶν ἰδίων φίλων*, 34.3) and the state of ill-will existing between the two sides (*τοιούτης δ' οὔσης δυσχρηστίας ἐν ἀμφοτέροις*, 34.4). But as the intent of these passages (especially of 34.4) does not particularly correspond to that expressed in 11.10, it is questionable whether Livy wrote his sentence to stand for these two of Polybius'. Yet it is even more doubtful that Livy invented the sentiment out of whole cloth, for in this chapter he has faithfully followed Polybius (except for omissions) wherever his accuracy can be checked. There does remain one possibility. Livy can be shown to have made at least one inversion in the order of Polybius' material: at this very point, rearranging two of Flamininus' three complaints, thereby emphasising the political, and the more important, one (see the chart above). Perhaps, then, the sentiment in L. 11.10 is genuinely Polybian, having stood originally in front of Flamininus' complaints, as some sort of introduction to them. Livy, already changing the order of some material in this section, may have done so again, placing this sentence subsequent to the grievances.

There are more definite grounds for such a suggestion. Firstly, Livy has possibly omitted the discussion of bribery out of patriotism and has unquestionably deleted numerous Polybian statements throughout which describe Flamininus' brazen attitude towards the Greeks.³⁷ So besides the lack of obvious correspondence, it is difficult to imagine that Livy would intentionally interpret P. 34.3-4 with what is expressed in L. 11.10; for this latter statement appears to be even more embarrassing to the Roman apologist. For this reason, it is also highly unlikely that Livy would freely invent the sentence. And secondly, Polybius has elsewhere made practically the same point: *ἐκεῖνοι (οἱ Αἰτωλοὶ) γὰρ δόξαντες ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων ὀλιγωρῆσθαι κατὰ πολλὰ περὶ τὴν ἔκβασιν τὴν ἐκ τοῦ Φιλίππου πολέμου . . .* (iii 7.2). Not only is the idea of 'being belittled' present in both (*ὀλιγωρῆσθαι* = *viliores levioresque . . . essent et viderentur*), but also the suggestion that the Aetolians were harassed more than once (*κατὰ πολλὰ* = *multa*).³⁸

That such a sentiment was contained within the present lacuna in Polybius, of course,

συνετέλει καὶ δι' αὐτοῦ καὶ διὰ τῶν ἰδίων φίλων (p. 97, n. 2). And 11.7, *donis regis imminere credebant invicti ab ea cupiditate animi virum*, was inspired not by the initial suspicion of bribery (which is, however, implied in 11.6: *cum Philīpho iam gratiae privatae locum quaerere [Romanum]*), but by the 'doubled' suspicion resulting from the reception of the Macedonian embassy (p. 101, n. 4). Despite the similarities of these passages, Holleaux's points are inconclusive. As Livy's account appears to be sound where Polybius is extant, Holleaux must prove a negative: that where Polybius is no longer extant, Livy's account is not sound.

Holleaux also claims there are passages in the Aetolian complaint which '[ont] tout l'air de n'être que du verbiage, imputable au seul Tite Live' (p. 97, n. 3). Among them 11.6: *ut dura atque aspera belli Aetoli exhauserint, pacis gratiam et fructum Romanus in se vertat* (p. 97, n. 3); 11.7: *et haud dubie decesserat iis aliquantum honoris*; and 11.10: *ob eas causas multa sedulo, ut viliores levioresque apud omnes essent et viderentur,*

faciebat (p. 101, n. 4). But the same methodological objections can be raised here as above—though in all the cases, Holleaux's subjective appreciation of the styles of the two authors must be given its due consideration.

³⁷ E.g., L. xxxii 36.10-37 = P. xviii 10-12 and L. xxxiii 28.1 = P. xviii 43.7-12. Complete citations and bibliography in Briscoe 22, n. 4.

³⁸ W. Weissenborn and H. J. Müller, *Titi Livi ab urbe condita libri* (4th edn.), on L. xxxiii 11.10, point out that *viliores levioresque* is somewhat of a Livian *sententia*: cf. L. xxvi 22.15. The latter passage comes within an annalistic chapter (Alfred Klotz, *Livius und seine Vorgänger* II 176), but is unquestionably Livy's own creation: he compares the moral qualities of Roman youths of antiquity with those of his own day. This only means that Livy may have employed in xxxiii 11.10 a favourite expression in translating from the Greek, and not that he actually created the sentiment stated there.

cannot be insisted upon, but a strong case can be made, based on method. The only statements in the extant Polybius which may have been Livy's inspiration do not appear to be close enough in thought, and there is no substantial evidence of any invention on his part anywhere in the episode. Indeed, Livy's deletion of anti-Roman statements found in Polybius further militates against the sentence being his own creation. Most importantly, Polybius elsewhere voices a similar sentiment, so it could be expected here too. But even if this blatant statement of Flaminius' *Realpolitik* is Livy's own invention or a loose and subjective translation of P. 34.3-4, it is still significant. The remainder of this section will reveal that subtle hints within Polybius' account suggest exactly what this passage expresses. Thus if it was not part of the original Polybian account, Livy would seem to have construed Polybius' narrative in the same manner as the present interpretation.

Leaving the question of Livy 11.10 aside, Polybius' treatment of the Aetolians in the entire episode distinctly differs from that for third-century affairs. A more balanced view is presented: not just Flaminius, but the Aetolians too, are given a hearing of their complaints. They fail to understand the real meaning of Titus' encouragement of the herald and the embassy, because as Aetolians, but also as Greeks (*ἤδη γὰρ κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα τῆς δωροδοκίας ἐπιπολαζούσης* κτλ., P. 34.7), they naturally interpret such action as motivated by the desire for personal gain (L. 11.6-7; P. 34.7-8). This naiveté is contrasted with Flaminius' shrewd and decisive actions. In fact, it would have done the Aetolians no good had they been less naive and realised from the outset Titus' true motives; for the die had been cast. Such is the picture which Polybius can be seen to present henceforth, right through to the confrontations at Tempe.

The reconstructed Polybian text indicates that certainly the Aetolians were deeply upset with Flaminius' favourable reception of Philip's herald and ambassadors. Indeed his actions are judged an astonishing volte-face: *ἡ τηλικαύτη μεταβολή* (34.7). But this opinion appears to be Polybius' also, and an examination of the subsequent narrative will reveal substantial evidence that initially other Greek states besides were equally upset; and only later, after Titus had reduced the Aetolian stature in the eyes of all, did the rest submit to Roman policy.

Before the meeting with Philip at Tempe, Flaminius canvassed the allies as to what to demand of the King (36.2). At first glance, it may seem strange that ultimately only two Greek states, Athamania and Aetolia, get a chance to speak. But Polybius has employed here a Thucydidean-like portrayal: while only two states deliver their opinions, they represent both sides of the question.

Amynder speaks first, briefly and with moderation (*βραχέα . . . καὶ μέτρια*). He asks the collected Greeks to help him against Philip once the Roman army has left (36.3-5). Notice that Amynder has technically not addressed himself to the question of the peace terms. In fact, all he is saying is that he will need help against Philip. Thus he assumes that Philip will remain on the throne, just as Flaminius had suggested before him (36.2).

Amynder's remark may well have been understood as Roman opposition to an anticipated Aetolian request; for in Polybius' construct, Flaminius could predict the Aetolian position and Amynder represented Flaminius. Holleaux³⁹ has pointed to P. xviii 3.2 as evidence that the Aetolians sought Philip's abdication, but a better passage is P. xviii 4.3 where, at an earlier conference, Phaeneas interrupts Philip with the charge that he must either fight or submit. And more emphatic still is the second of Titus' three reasons for opposing the Aetolians: 'he did not wish to expel Philip from his kingdom and so leave the Aetolians rulers of the Greeks' (xviii 34.1).⁴⁰ Clearly, by this time, it was evident to all that Aetolia did not wish to negotiate.

³⁹ Holleaux 34, n. 1.

⁴⁰ Adopted from Walbank II 592-3.

And Amynder no doubt knew both this Aetolian policy and Flamininus' opposition to it, for the King had earned himself a reputation of siding with the strongest power of the day. In the First Macedonian War, he helped Philip (for a price) when Macedonia appeared dominant (L. xxxvi 31.11); yet by 200, he was more than co-operating with Rome (L. xxxi 28.1). The pattern is repeated: by 192, an ally of Antiochus (L. xxxv 47.8), he subsequently made a desperate effort to return to Rome's good graces (P. xxi 25.1-2). Even more to the point, Polybius believed that Flamininus sent Amynder ahead to Rome after the conference at Nicaea because '... he was a man of pliable character, and would be easily persuaded by his (Flamininus') own friends in the city to take any course they might propose' (xviii 10.7). It is then reasonable to see Amynder's assumption that Philip will remain on the throne as directly echoing the opinion of Flamininus. (It is interesting—and perhaps further indicative—that Amynder is also certain that the Romans *will* evacuate Greece.)

After Amynder, Alexander the Aetolian follows. Yet while Amynder addressed the Greeks, Alexander speaks directly to Titus—indicating that Amynder did reflect the position of Flamininus. Alexander maintains that the only solution is to depose Philip, which is Rome's policy and Titus' promise to the Greeks. Flamininus refutes him, saying that neither is the case (*c.* 37). Furthermore, that was not the demand made upon Philip before Cynoscephalae. "Therefore it indeed surprises me," he said, "that after taking part in the conferences for peace you are now all (*ἅπαντες*) irreconcilable."⁴¹

This statement rightly bothered Holleaux.⁴² He remembered that the Aetolians had clearly not wished to negotiate at Nicaea. Yet now Flamininus was describing their present refusal as a change of behaviour. Holleaux, believing that Flamininus was speaking only to the Aetolians, called the statement 'une apparente contradiction'. The contradiction disappears, however, if *ἅπαντες* is recognised as referring not just to the Aetolians, but to all the Greeks. This is the natural translation for *ἅπαντες*; and Polybius uses it elsewhere with the same meaning (xviii 10.1). Indeed, within the passage, Flamininus appears to be addressing more than just the Aetolians when he argues that a strong Macedonia would be beneficial to the *Greeks* (37.8-9). It may well be, then, that many of the states that were willing to negotiate at Nicaea now side with the Aetolians, and it is this entire group which Titus is chastising. Thus the Aetolian statement is like that of Amynder's: representative of a position taken by more than just the speaker. The Thucydidean schema is again confirmed.⁴³

Though Titus includes all the Greeks in his chastisement, he ends with a clever device calculated to isolate the Aetolians. He switches back to addressing them alone, making an extraordinarily arrogant statement.⁴⁴ In a council ostensibly called to canvass Greek sentiment, Titus announces that Rome will make peace with Philip along the previous negotiating lines. The Aetolians, on the other hand, are free to consider among themselves—a clear taunt that if the Aetolians want Philip deposed, they are welcome to try on their own⁴⁵ (inviting remembrances of Aetolia's previous wars with Philip). The jibe is addressed only to the Aetolians, but the rest of the Greeks get the message. Rather, there are two messages. First, Roman policy has been set: Philip will not be deposed. So the Greeks, as Amynder had predicted, will have to live with him when the Romans leave. Second, Flamininus will take no further consideration of Aetolian demands. Greek states which

⁴¹ For this passage and the next one, Paton's translation in the Loeb edition is used: it is here more accurate and in the second passage more complete.

⁴² Holleaux 34, n. 2.

⁴³ Walbank, 'Speeches in Greek Historians'

(*supra*, n. 15), has already suggested some loose connections between the two Greek historians in their approach to speech writing.

⁴⁴ Cf. Holleaux 100, n. 6.

⁴⁵ Cf. André Aymard, *Les premiers rapports de Rome et la confédération achaienne* 169 and Briscoe 271.

felt they could influence Roman policy by forming a strong collective around Aetolia are mistaken. Such is underscored by Titus' parting insults to Phaeneas (37.12).⁴⁶

On the following day, Philip met with the Greeks (c.38):

Philip entered and with great skill and sound sense cut away the ground on which they all based their violent demands (τὰς πάντων ὄρμης) by saying that he yielded to and would execute all the former demands of the Romans and the allies, and that he submitted all other questions to the decision of the Senate. After he had said this, all the others remained silent, but Phaeneas the Aetolian representative said . . .

The 'violent demands' and the submission of 'all other questions' indicate that the allies still ask more of Philip than they did at Nicaea.⁴⁷ This is certainly more than what Flamininus said should be required of him (37.10). But the other Greeks seem to learn their lesson. When they press their claims, Philip acts εὐστόχως καὶ συνετῶς for he knows what will undercut their demands: the disputed points can be settled by the Senate. This is enough to silence all the Greek states immediately, save Aetolia. The rest realise from the Aetolian confrontation with Titus that little is to be gained by disagreeing with the Romans. Polybius has throughout portrayed Flamininus' actions as predicated upon a desire to diminish the Aetolian position in the eyes of others.

This portrayal continues right into the debate over the treaty of 212/11; and perhaps one of its complexities can be better understood if viewed in that light. The problems surrounding the extant treaty inscription (*SEG* xiii 382) and its relationship to Flamininus' response concerning the treaty (P. xviii 38.8-9) are well known, and the two particular points of contention need be stated only briefly. The first, on Titus' claim that the treaty was no longer in effect, appears indeterminable, given the current state of evidence.⁴⁸ The second is Flamininus' statement that even if the treaty were still operative, its terms preclude the handing over to Aetolia of towns which voluntarily surrendered to Rome (xviii 38.9). At present, most scholars find it impossible to reconcile that contention with what is on the stone (ll. 15-20). Such a proposition has reflected badly on Polybius' credibility as a source. For if Flamininus is lying, the usual reason given why Polybius would record the episode without indicating as much is his hatred of the Aetolians.⁴⁹

If the dialogue is put into the context of the entire narrative, however, it can be seen that, though Flamininus may have been lying, Polybius is not culpable of intentionally passing

⁴⁶ Holleaux (100, n. 6) recognised at least the general import of Flamininus' statements, sensing that they were addressed to the Aetolians, yet intended for all the Greeks. Aymard, (*supra*, n. 45) 170, saw also what Flamininus was trying to accomplish with his insults against the Aetolians: 'Elle (une semonce . . . du proconsul) ne saurait laisser les alliés indifférents'. Yet Polybius must have included the insult with a bit of irony: 'Cease this trifling Phaeneas! For I will so settle the terms of the peace that Philip will be unable, even if he wished it, to molest the Greeks' (xviii 37.12). In fact, Flamininus, as it turned out, could not keep Philip from harming the Greeks (P. xxiii 1); and Polybius, at least, holds Philip responsible for the next Macedonian War fought by his son, Perseus (xxiii 18.10 f.). So Phaeneas' prediction (xviii 37.11) proved true.

⁴⁷ Though their main demand was no longer the abdication of Philip, for even the Aetolians tacitly accepted Philip in demanding only the four towns (38.3 f.). Later, however, the Aetolians and perhaps

other Greek states—Polybius is vague—work against the peace (39.7).

⁴⁸ Recently: E. Badian, 'Titus Quinctius Flamininus: Philhellenism and *Realpolitik*', *Louise Taft Semple Memorial Lectures* (Cincinnati, 1970), 48-53; and Review of Lehmann (*supra*, n. 1) 642.

⁴⁹ The original publisher of the inscription, Günther Klaffenbach (*supra*, n. 1) 17 f., hesitantly suggested that Polybius both changed the Aetolian arguments to the worse and failed to criticise Flamininus' dissembling in order to fool the reader into believing the Roman commander.

Subsequent attempts to avoid such a construct have necessitated trying to make the inscription and Flamininus' statement accord; most recently, G. A. Lehmann (*supra*, n. 1) 51-131, but he has been effectively countered by Badian (Review of Lehmann [*supra*, n. 1] 639-41, Deininger (Review of Lehmann [*supra*, n. 1] 66-7) and Walbank (Review of Lehmann, *JRS* lviii [1968] 253-4). For a complete bibliography of the problem, cf. *Die Staatsverträge des Altertums* III no. 536 (ed. by Hatto H. Schmitt) and Briscoe 273.

the statement off as the truth. From the beginning of *c.* 34, Polybius has portrayed Flamininus as rejecting things Aetolian, and this carries right through to the treaty. He has avoided the Aetolians, ignored their counsel, insulted them in front of the other Greeks, and has indicated to these Greeks that Aetolia is no longer a favourite in the eyes of Rome. Thus the treaty, while the final and most important cause of the *ὄργή*, is still just a part of a long series of abuses which the Aetolians suffer, confirming Polybius' earlier description of the Aetolians being belittled *κατὰ πολλὰ* (iii 7.2). At this point, as Polybius has already revealed Flamininus' attitudes and intentions, the reader may or may not be attuned to the contradiction between the treaty and Flamininus' statement—but that does not much matter. To Polybius, it is not nearly so important for the reader to realise any special deceit that Flamininus may have performed in this rebuttal as it is to see his consistent refusal to deal with the Aetolians in a civil manner. Thus there is no reason for Polybius to interrupt his account and render the passage its own commentary: Flamininus' actions throughout speak for themselves.

The Aetolians subsequently depart sullen, knowing that further argument is useless—again not so much because Titus is technically in the wrong on a specific legal point, as because they finally understand how he intends to treat them in general.⁵⁰ Though later they violently object to the commission's decision and are permitted to appeal (xviii 47.8–9), they finally do so only under much Roman persuasion (48.6–10). But when the Senate refers the matter back to Flamininus, Polybius is able to say that the Aetolians are leaning towards war (L. xxxiii 49.8).⁵¹ The *ὄργή* is complete, for the Aetolians can predict Flamininus' response.

The picture which Polybius presents forces him to minimise in his own mind events which, as they imply co-operation between Titus and the Aetolians, indicate that the episodes at Larisa and Tempe were not nearly as dramatic as he portrays them. Polybius conveniently overlooks the importance of the fact that when pressed for help by the Boeotians in an assassination plot, Flamininus turns the matter over to the Aetolian *στρατηγός* (xviii 43.11–12). This occurs after the initial confrontations and suggests the Aetolians are still co-operating. And there is no hint of anger when the Senate instructs Titus to write to Prusias concerning Cius (xviii 44.5), most assuredly at the request of the Aetolians.⁵² Finally, despite Aetolian complaints, they appear to have come out quite well from the war, being awarded Locris and Phocis (xviii 47.9). But that is tucked away within Polybius' catalogue of what all the Greeks received. Clearly what Polybius intended to emphasise was not what the Aetolians gained, but in what manner Rome granted and, more importantly, refused to grant territories to the Aetolians.

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This study has yielded two related results. First, it appears that Polybius suspended his conscious vilification of the Aetolians, certainly for the years 191–189 and quite possibly for the years 196–192. Though this has not been noted previously, it should come as no

⁵⁰ Polybius remarks that while the Aetolians were unhappy the rest of the Greeks rejoiced at what Titus said (P. xviii 39.1). It is likely that in his denial that cities which surrendered to Roman *fides* were ever to be included within the Aetolian League by the terms of the treaty, Flamininus was serving notice of his policy of freedom for the Greeks (*cf.* E. Badian, *Foreign Clientelae* 72). This, and not the reduced position of the Aetolians, would be the cause of Greek joy. The Greeks will be little concerned

with whether Flamininus is historically accurate: they are sufficiently delighted that if the Romans were ever in fact turning over to the Aetolians autonomous towns which had voluntarily surrendered, this is no longer their intention.

⁵¹ From Polybius: Nissen 152–3 and Briscoe 335.

⁵² Cius was under Aetolian control until just prior to the outbreak of war: P. xv 23.6–10; xviii 3.12, and 4.7; *cf.* P. xvi 34.4 and L. xxxi 31.4.

surprise. When Polybius wrote about third-century Aetolia, he envisioned a northern neighbour thirsting for conquest inside the Achaean sphere of influence. And as a patriot he heaped abuse at every opportunity. When Aetolia confronted Rome in the 190s, however, Polybius was able to view the events with some detachment, as the struggle was no longer one primarily concerning the Peloponnesus. More importantly, to the self-proclaimed chronicler of the Roman empire, the Syrian War fitted directly into the context of that dominion.

This conclusion is strengthened by Polybius' understanding of the *αἰτία* of the war: the Aetolian *ὄργη* arising out of the events at Larisa and Tempe. For the study has shown secondly that Polybius also viewed these confrontations as being brought about by Rome's desire to have things her own way in Greece. Nothing in fact could have been more natural for Polybius, who already saw Roman conquest as an inevitability, than to present his account of the Aetolian-Roman antagonism as another link in the growing imperialism.

Regarding this picture of Rome's conquest of the Mediterranean, Walbank has detected a distinct dichotomy.⁵³ Polybius, it seems, worked both as reporter and editor. The former simply recorded the facts; and they indicate that at least until the time of the Second Macedonian War, or perhaps even the Syrian War, Rome did not purposely involve herself in the several wars which she had to fight. The editor, however, set out to show that, from the Hannibalic War onwards, for Rome expansion and empire were conscious goals. Thus, in many instances, Polybius' assertions are not born out by his facts.

Whatever the actual events dictate, then, Polybius as editor would be expected to fit the Aetolian conflict into his preconceived pattern. For this reason in part, he has avoided his usual capricious criticisms of that people. He may rebuke individual Aetolians for being misguided or over-ambitious; and he may call the *πρόφασις* and the propaganda false. But as he has subtly portrayed the confrontations at Larisa and Tempe as being brought on by the Roman commander obeying the will of *Realpolitik*, he must also represent the Aetolians as victims of Flamininus' actions. For Polybius to refrain from blaming and slandering the Aetolians must have been difficult indeed. At least we moderns can appreciate his effort.⁵⁴

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⁵³ In *JRS* liii (1963) and *Polybius* 160–66.

⁵⁴ Suggestions and encouragement by the Editor of the *Journal* and by my dear friends, Barbara Forbes, Judith Ginsburg, and David Thomas, are here gratefully acknowledged. I am especially indebted to Professor Erich S. Gruen who suggested

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